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Abstract. A combiner is a construction formed out of two hash func-
tions that is secure if one of the underlying functions is. Conventional
combiners are known not to support short outputs: if the hash func-
tions have n-bit outputs the combiner should have at least almost 2n
bits of output in order to be robust for collision resistance (Pietrzak,
CRYPTO 2008). Mittelbach (ACNS 2013) introduced a relaxed security
model for combiners and presented “Cryptophia’s short combiner,” a
rather delicate construction of an n-bit combiner that achieves optimal
collision, preimage, and second preimage security. We re-analyze Cryp-
tophia’s combiner and show that a collision can be found in two queries
and a second preimage in one query, invalidating the claimed results. We
additionally propose a way to fix the design in order to re-establish the
original security results.
Keywords: hash functions, combiner, short, attack, collision resistance,
preimage resistance
1 Introduction
A hash function combiner is a construction with access to two or more hash
functions, and which achieves certain security properties as long as sufficiently
many underlying hash functions satisfy these security properties. The first to
formally consider the principle of combiners were Herzberg [18, 19] and Harnik
et al. [17]. Two classical examples are the concatenation combiner CH1,H2concat (M) =
H1(M) ‖ H2(M) and xor combiner CH1,H2xor (M) = H1(M)⊕H2(M). Combiners
function as an extra security barrier, still offering the desired security even if one
of the hash functions gets badly broken. As such, combiners find a wide range of
applications, including TLS [6–8] and SSL [15] for which the combiner security
was analyzed by Fischlin et al. [14]. We refer to Lehmann’s PhD thesis [23] for
a comprehensive exposition of combiners.
A combiner is called robust for some security property if this property holds
as long as at least one of the underlying hash functions does. For instance, a
combiner CH1,H2 based on hash functions H1, H2 is called robust for collision
resistance if a collision attack on the combiner implies an attack on H1 and H2.
Note that CH1,H2concat is clearly robust for collision resistance, but C
H1,H2
xor is not.
On the other hand, CH1,H2xor is robust for pseudorandomness [14], while C
H1,H2
concat
is not. Similar results can be obtained for other security properties such as
(second) preimage resistance and MAC security [14,18]. Various multi-property
robust combiners have been designed by Fischlin et al. [11–13]. (Without going
into detail, we refer to interesting results on the security of CH1,H2concat beyond
robustness, by Joux [22], Nandi and Stinson [28], Hoch and Shamir [20, 21],
Fischlin and Lehmann [10], and Mendel et al. [25].)
The concatenation combiner is robust for collision resistance, but its output
size is the sum of the output sizes of the underlying hash functions. At CRYPTO
2006, Boneh and Boyen [3] analyzed the question of designing a collision robust
combiner with a shorter output size. This question got subsequently answered
negatively by Canetti et al. [4] and Pietrzak [29, 30]. In detail, Pietrzak [30]
demonstrated that no collision robust combiner from two n-bit hash functions
exists with output length shorter than 2n−Θ(log n). A similar observation was
recently made for (second) preimage resistance by Rjasˇko [32] and Mittelbach
[26].
These negative results are in part credited to the rather stringent require-
ments the model of robustness puts on the construction, being the explicit exis-
tence of a reduction. At ACNS 2013, Mittelbach [27] introduced a relaxed model
where the combiner is based on ideal hash functions and no explicit reduction
is needed. Throughout, we will refer to this model as the ideal combiner model,
as opposed to the standard reduction-based robust combiner model. Intuitively,
the model captures the case of security of the combiner if one of the underlying
hash functions is ideal but the other one is under full control of the adversary.
While the ideal combiner model puts stronger requirements on the underlying
primitives, it allows to bypass the limitations of the robust combiner model.
Particularly, it enables analysis of more complex designs and combines well with
the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [24] and its application to hash
functions by Coron et al. [5].
Yet, it turns out to still be highly non-trivial to construct a secure combiner in
the ideal combiner model. For instance, the above-mentioned xor combiner is not
secure: if H1 = R is an ideal hash function, the adversary can simply define H2 =
R. Also, ideal combiner security is not immediately achieved for straightforward
generalizations of this xor combiner. As expected, the concatenation combiner
is secure in the ideal combiner model, but recall that it has an output size of 2n
bits.
Mittelbach [27] also introduced an ingenious n-bit combiner CH1,H2mit from n-
bit hash functions that – in the ideal combiner model – achieves optimal 2n/2
collision security and 2n preimage and second preimage security. Mittelbach’s
combiner is also known as “Cryptophia’s short combiner.” The design circum-
vents the impossibility results of [3,4,29,30] on the existence of short combiners
in the standard combiner model. CH1,H2mit is additionally proven to be a secure
pseudorandom function and MAC in the robust combiner model. This result has
been awarded as the best student paper of ACNS 2013.
At a high level, Mittelbach’s combiner is a keyed combiner defined as
CH1,H2mit (k,M) = H1(prep1(k1, k2, k3,M))⊕H2(prep2(k4, k5, k6,M)) ,
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where k = (k1, . . . , k6) is a fixed key, and prep1 and prep2 are two well-thought
preprocessing functions discarded from this introduction (cf. Sect. 4).
Our Contribution
We re-analyze the short combiner of Mittelbach, and show the existence of an
adversary that generates collisions for CH1,H2mit in 2 queries and second preimages
in 1 query. The adversary is in line with Mittelbach’s ideal combiner model,
where H1 is a random oracle R and H2 is pre-defined by the adversary. The
crux of the attack lies in the observation that the two preprocessing functions
may not be injective, depending on the adversarial choice of H2, an oversight in
the proof.
We additionally present a solution to fix Mittelbach’s combiner, which re-
quires a more balanced usage of the keys in each of the preprocessing functions.
We also prove that this fix does the job, i.e., restores the claimed security bounds
up to a constant factor.
Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce some pre-
liminaries in Sect. 2. The ideal combiner model as outlined by Mittelbach is
summarized in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes Mittelbach’s short combiner CH1,H2mit
in detail. Our attacks on CH1,H2mit are given in Sect. 5 and we discuss how it can
be fixed in Sect. 6.
2 Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, we denote by {0, 1}n the set of bit strings of size n. By {0, 1}∗ we
denote the set of bit strings of arbitrary length. For two bit strings x, y, their
concatenation is denoted x‖y and their bitwise exclusive or (xor) as x ⊕ y (for
which x and y are presumed to be equally long). The size of x is denoted |x|. For
b ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by b¯ = 3 − b ∈ {2, 1}. If X is a set, we denote by x $←− X
the uniformly randomly sampling of an element from X . If X is, on the other
hand, a distribution, we use the same notation to say that x is chosen according
to the distribution.
A hash function family is defined as H : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for
κ, n ∈ N, where for every k ∈ {0, 1}κ, Hk is a deterministic function that maps
messages M of arbitrary length to digests of fixed length n. In security games,
the key will conventionally be randomly drawn and disclosed at the beginning of
the security experiment; it is simply used to select a function Hk randomly from
the entire family of functions. The key input to Hk is left implicit if it is clear
from the context. A random oracle on n bits is a function R which provides a
random output of size n for each new query [2].
We model adversaries A as probabilistic algorithms with black-box access to
zero or more oracles O1, . . . ,On, written as AO1,...,On . We assume the adversary
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always knows the security parameters (often the input and output sizes of the
combiner and underlying hash functions) and refrain from explicitly mentioning
these as input to A. We consider computationally unbounded adversaries whose
complexities are measured by the number of queries made to their oracles. We
assume that the adversary never makes queries to which it knows the answer in
advance.
If X is a random variable, the min-entropy of X is defined as
H∞(X) = − log(max
x
Pr (X = x)) .
Note that we can equivalently define H∞(X) in terms of a predictor A that aims
to guess X, denoted H∞(X) = − log(maxAPr (X = A)) [1]. Following [1,9,27],
we define the (average) conditional min-entropy of X conditioned on random
variable Z as
H˜∞ (X | Z) = − log(maxA Pr
(
X = AZ)) ,
where A is a predictor that participates in random experiment Z. It has been
demonstrated that H˜∞ (X | Z) ≥ H∞(X,Z) − b, where Z may take 2b values
[9, 31].
3 Ideal Combiner Model
A (k, l)-combiner for security property prop is a construction based on l hash
functions, that achieves prop security as long as k out of l hash functions satisfy
this property. Most combiners known in literature are (1, 2)-combiners, consid-
ering a construction CH1,H2 from two hash functions H1, H2. We focus on this
type of combiners. A robust black-box combiner for security property prop is
a combiner CH1,H2 for which an attack under prop can be reduced to an at-
tack on H1 and H2. Various results on robustness of combiners have been pre-
sented [11–14, 17, 18]. Pietrzak [30] proved that the output length of a collision
secure black-box combiner is at least the sum of the output lengths of H1 and H2
(minus a logarithmic term in the output size of H1, H2). A similar observation
was recently made for second preimage and preimage resistance by Rjasˇko [32]
and Mittelbach [26].
At ACNS 2013, Mittelbach elegantly lifted the security of combiners to the
ideal model. That is, the hash functions underpinning CH1,H2 are based on a
random oracle. The model discards the explicit need of a reduction, and com-
bines well with the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [24] and its
application to hash functions by Coron et al. [5]. Nevertheless, this model, and
particularly capturing the fact that one of the hash functions may be non-ideal,
is not at all straightforward. We paraphrase the model in our own terminology.
The prop security of a combiner CH1,H2 : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n based
on two hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}κh×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n is captured as follows
(the model generalizes straightforwardly to other domains and ranges). Let R be
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a random oracle and k
$←− {0, 1}κ. Consider a two-stage adversary A = (A1,A2)
with unbounded computational power. A1 gets no input and outputs b ∈ {1, 2}
and a description of an efficient stateless function HR : {0, 1}κh × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n which may make calls to R. Then, A2, with oracle access to (R, HR)
and knowledge of the key k, aims to break security property prop for CH
R,R (if
b = 1) or CR,H
R
(if b = 2). Formally, the advantage of A is defined as follows:
AdvpropC (A) = PrR,k
(
(b,HR, st) $←− A1 ,
(Hb, Hb¯)← (HR,R)
:
AH1,H22 (k, st) breaks
prop for CH1,H2
)
,
where the randomness is taken over the choice of random oracle R, random key
k ∈ {0, 1}κ, and coins of A.
The formal descriptions of the security advantages slightly differ for various
types of security properties. In general, for collision, preimage, and second preim-
age resistance the definitions show resemblances with, but are more complex
than, the formalization of Rogaway and Shrimpton [33]. For collision security of
CH1,H2 , the advantage of A is defined as
AdvcollC (A) = PrR,k
 (b,HR, st)
$←− A1 ,
(Hb, Hb¯)← (HR,R) ,
(M,M ′) $←− AH1,H22 (k, st)
:
M 6= M ′ ∧
CH1,H2(M) =
CH1,H2(M ′)
 .
For (second) preimage resistance, we focus on everywhere (second) preimage
resistance. In everywhere preimage resistance, A1 selects an image Y ∈ {0, 1}n
at the start of the experiment. In everywhere second preimage resistance, A1
selects a first preimage M ∈ {0, 1}λ at the start of the experiment, for some
λ <∞. The advantages of A are as follows:
AdvepreC (A) = PrR,k
 (b,HR, Y, st)
$←− A1 ,
(Hb, Hb¯)← (HR,R) ,
M
$←− AH1,H22 (k, st)
: CH1,H2(M) = Y
 ,
Adv
esec[λ]
C (A) = PrR,k
 (b,HR,M, st)
$←− A1 ,
(Hb, Hb¯)← (HR,R) ,
M ′ $←− AH1,H22 (k, st)
:
M 6= M ′ ∧
CH1,H2(M) =
CH1,H2(M ′)
 .
The notion of everywhere second preimage resistance is also known as target col-
lision resistance [16] and implies conventional second preimage resistance where
M is randomly drawn. (We note that Mittelbach [27] considered target collision
resistance and conventional second preimage resistance separately. Additionally,
we slightly simplified the notion of preimage resistance, considering the case A1
selects the image rather than a set X from which the first preimage is secretly
and randomly drawn.)
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4 Mittelbach’s Combiner
We consider Cryptophia’s combiner CH1,H2mit : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n from
Mittelbach [27], where κ = 6n. Let ki ∈ {0, 1}n for i = 1, . . . , 6 be independently
chosen keys, and write k = (k1, . . . , k6). Let H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be two
hash functions. The combiner is given by
CH1,H2mit (k,M) = H1
(
m˜11‖ · · · ‖m˜1`
)
⊕H2
(
m˜21‖ · · · ‖m˜2`
)
,
where the message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is first injectively padded into n-bit message
blocks m1‖ · · · ‖m` = M‖pad(M) using some padding function pad, which are
subsequently preprocessed as
m˜1j = H1(1 ‖ mj ⊕ k1)⊕mj ⊕ k2 ⊕H2(1 ‖ mj ⊕ k3) ,
m˜2j = H2(0 ‖ mj ⊕ k4)⊕mj ⊕ k5 ⊕H1(0 ‖ mj ⊕ k6) ,
(1)
for j = 1, . . . , `. We remark that we swapped k1 with k3 and k4 with k6 compared
to the original specification [27].
5 Attack
In the security model we recaptured in Sect. 3, Mittelbach proved that CH1,H2mit
achieves collision security up to 2(n+1)/2 queries and preimage and second preim-
age security up to 2n queries.1 In the next proposition, we show that the collision
result is incorrect. After the result, we also explain why the attack directly im-
plies a second preimage attack. The work of [27] as well as its full version do not
state any properties of the padding function pad(M). We assume a 10∗-padding
concatenated with length strengthening. For simplicity and without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that |pad(M)| ≤ n, which is the case if the message length is
encoded with at most n− 1 bits.
Proposition 1. There exists an adversary A making 2 queries, such that
AdvcollCmit(A) = 1.
Proof. Let R be a random oracle and k1, . . . , k6 $←− {0, 1}n. We focus on an
adversary A = (A1,A2) that finds a collision for CR,H
R
mit , where H
R is the hash
function defined by A1. Our adversary proceeds as follows. A1 outputs b = 2
and the following hash function HR:
HR(x) =
{
R(x)⊕ y, if x = 1‖y for some y ∈ {0, 1}n,
0, otherwise.
1 The formal preimage result is slightly different, claiming security up to 2H∞(X )
queries, where the first preimage is secretly and randomly drawn from an adversar-
ially chosen set X .
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This simplifies the combiner to CR,H
R
mit (k,M) = R
(
m˜11‖ · · · ‖m˜1`
)
, where
m˜1j = R(1 ‖ mj ⊕ k1)⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕R(1 ‖ mj ⊕ k3) ,
for j = 1, . . . , `. Next, the adversary A2 gets as input (k1, . . . , k6) and outputs
colliding pair M and M ′ = M ⊕ k1 ⊕ k3 for some M ∈ {0, 1}n.
We proceed with showing that the colliding pair is valid. As |M | = |M ′| = n,
the messages are padded as m1‖m2 = M‖pad(M) and m′1‖m′2 = M ′‖pad(M ′),
where m1 = M , m
′
1 = M
′, and m2 = m′2. The latter implies m˜
1
2 = m˜
′ 1
2 . The
preprocessed m˜11 and m˜
′ 1
1 satisfy
m˜11 = R(1 ‖M ⊕ k1)⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕R(1 ‖M ⊕ k3)
= R(1 ‖M ⊕ k3)⊕ k2 ⊕ k3 ⊕R(1 ‖M ⊕ k1) = m˜′ 11 .
Concluding, m˜11‖m˜12 = m˜′ 11 ‖m˜′ 12 and thus
CR,H
R
mit (k,M) = R
(
m˜11‖m˜12
)
= R
(
m˜′ 11 ‖m˜′ 12
)
= CR,H
R
mit (k,M
′) . uunionsq
Proposition 2. Let λ <∞. There exists an adversary A making 1 query, such
that Adv
esec[λ]
Cmit
(A) = 1.
Proof. In the attack of Prop. 1 the choice of M is independent of (k1, . . . , k6).
Therefore, the attack also works if M is chosen by A1 at the beginning of the
game. uunionsq
The flaw in the security analysis of [27] lies in the fact that it only considers
distributions of m˜cj computed from mj , k3c−2, k3c−1, k3c via (1) for c ∈ {1, 2},
but never joint distributions of m˜cj , m˜
′ c
j given two messages m,m
′. In more
detail, Prop. 4.5 of the full version of [27] inadvertently assumes that m˜c and
m˜′ c are mutually distinct whenever m 6= m′. The preimage bound derived in [27]
is nevertheless correct, and so are the analyses of CH1,H2mit as a pseudorandom
function and MAC.
6 Fix
To fix Mittelbach’s combiner CH1,H2mit , we suggest to use an additional set of keys
l1, l2 ∈ {0, 1}n as separate input to H1, H2 in the preprocessing functions of (1).
Consequently, we can leave out mj ⊕ k2 and mj ⊕ k5 from these functions as
they have become redundant, and we can simply set (k4, k6) = (k1, k2). (For
the original CH1,H2mit these keys k2, k4, k5, k6 are necessary to guarantee preimage
resistance.)
More formally, we suggest combiner CH1,H2 : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n,
where κ = 4n. Let k1, k2, l1, l2 ∈ {0, 1}n be independently chosen keys, and
write kl = (k1, k2, l1, l2). Let H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be two hash functions.
The combiner is given by
CH1,H2(kl,M) = H1
(
m˜11‖ · · · ‖m˜1`
)
⊕H2
(
m˜21‖ · · · ‖m˜2`
)
,
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where the message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is first injectively padded into n-bit message
blocks m1‖ · · · ‖m` = M‖pad(M) using some padding function pad, which are
subsequently preprocessed as
m˜1j = H1(0 ‖ l1 ‖ mj ⊕ k1)⊕H2(0 ‖ l2 ‖ mj ⊕ k2) ,
m˜2j = H1(1 ‖ l1 ‖ mj ⊕ k1)⊕H2(1 ‖ l2 ‖ mj ⊕ k2) ,
(2)
for j = 1, . . . , `.
This fix, indeed, guarantees that m˜c and m˜′ c are mutually different whenever
m,m′ are, except with small probability. In the remainder of this section, we will
prove that CH1,H2 indeed achieves the originally claimed security bounds for
collision, preimage, and second preimage resistance up to an inevitable constant
factor. For a proof on the robustness for pseudorandomness and MAC security
we refer to [27].
Before we proceed, we remark explicitly that we require HR to be a stateless
hash function. In the artificial case in which HR is allowed to hold state, CH1,H2
is insecure. An attack is given in App. A.
Security Proofs
For c ∈ {1, 2} we define preprocessing function m˜c(kl,m) on input of kl =
(k1, k2, l1, l2) ∈ {0, 1}4n and m ∈ {0, 1}n as
m˜c(kl,m) = H1(c− 1 ‖ l1 ‖ m⊕ k1)⊕H2(c− 1 ‖ l2 ‖ m⊕ k2) .
These preprocessing functions correspond to the two equations of (2) for c = 1, 2.
The remainder of the proof is as follows. In Lem. 1 we compute the (conditioned)
min-entropies of the values m˜c. This lemma is a direct generalization of Lems. 1
and 2 of [27]. Then, preimage security is proven in Thm. 1, collision security in
Thm. 2, and second preimage security in Thm. 3.
Lemma 1. Let R be an n-bit random oracle and let kl $←− {0, 1}4n. Let HR be
a hash function with access to R (but not using kl). Then, for all c ∈ {1, 2} and
distinct m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}n,
H˜∞ (m˜c(kl,m) | kl,m) ≥ n− log(qH) , (3)
H˜∞ (m˜c(kl,m) | m˜c(kl,m′), kl,m,m′) ≥ n− 2 log(qH) , (4)
H˜∞
(
m˜c(kl,m) | m˜c¯(kl,m′), kl,m,m′) ≥ n− 2 log(qH) , (5)
H˜∞
(
m˜c(kl,m) | m˜c¯(kl,m), kl,m) ≥ n− 2 log(qH) , (6)
where qH is the number of calls to R in one evaluation to HR. (We note that
conditioning in (5-6) is done on m˜c¯, as opposed to m˜c in (4).)
Proof. The combiner C is symmetric, and without loss of generality we assume
b = 2, hence (H1, H2) = (R, HR), where R is an n-bit random oracle and HR
is defined by adversary A1. Also, c = 1 without loss of generality.
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The min-entropy of (3) reads
H˜∞
(
m˜1(kl,m) | kl,m)
= H˜∞
(
R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ m⊕ k1)⊕HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ m⊕ k2)
∣∣∣ kl,m)
= H˜∞
(
R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ mˆ⊕ kˆ1)⊕HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ mˆ)
∣∣∣ kˆ1, l1, l2, mˆ) ,
where the second step is by substitution of (kˆ1, mˆ) = (k1 ⊕ k2,m ⊕ k2) and
by leaving out the redundant k2 in the condition. Note that the evaluation of
R is independent of the evaluation of HR, unless HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ mˆ) evaluates
R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ mˆ ⊕ kˆ1). Here, we recall that kˆ1, l1, l2 are mutually independently
and randomly drawn, but mˆ is chosen by A2 and may depend on (kˆ1, l1, l2). The
hash function HR chosen by A1 makes qH evaluations of R, which can decrease
the entropy by at most log(qH) bits in any experiment. Thus, we find:
H˜∞
(
m˜1(kl,m) | kl,m)
≥ H˜∞
(
l1, mˆ(kˆ1, l1, l2)⊕ kˆ1
∣∣∣ l2, mˆ(kˆ1, l1, l2))− log(qH)
≥ n− log(qH) .
We proceed with the min-entropy of (4):
H˜∞
(
m˜1(kl,m) | m˜1(kl,m′), kl,m,m′)
= H˜∞
(R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ m⊕ k1)⊕HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ m⊕ k2) ∣∣
R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ m′ ⊕ k1)⊕HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ m′ ⊕ k2), kl,m,m′
)
≥ H˜∞
(
R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ mˆ⊕ kˆ1)⊕HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ mˆ),
R(0 ‖ l1 ‖ mˆ′ ⊕ kˆ1)⊕HR(0 ‖ l2 ‖ mˆ′)
∣∣∣∣∣ kˆ1, l1, l2, mˆ, mˆ′
)
− n , (7)
where we substituted (kˆ1, mˆ, mˆ
′) = (k1⊕k2,m⊕k2,m′⊕k2) and left out redun-
dant k2. Here, we recall that mˆ 6= mˆ′, but both message blocks may depend on
kˆ1, l1, l2. Before proceeding, we pause to see what happens if we were considering
the original combiner CR,H
R
mit of Sect. 4. In this case, l1 and l2 are absent. The
entropy term in (7) then equals at most n if mˆ′ = mˆ ⊕ kˆ1 (in case HR = R),
leading to a lower bound ≥ 0. Note that the attack of Sect. 5 takes the message
blocks this way.
Returning to (7), as kˆ1, l1, l2 are independently and randomly drawn and
mˆ 6= mˆ′, the two terms in the min-entropy are independent, both achieve a
min-entropy of at least n− log(qH) (by (3)), and hence
H˜∞
(
m˜1(kl,m) | m˜1(kl,m′), kl,m,m′) ≥ 2(n− log(qH))− n ≥ n− 2 log(qH) .
The same reasoning applies to the min-entropies of (5) and (6), where for the
latter we particularly use that the two evaluations ofR are mutually independent
due to the domain separation 1/0. uunionsq
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Theorem 1. For any adversary A, where A2 makes qA queries and where every
evaluation of HR makes at most qH calls to R, we have AdvepreC (A) ≤ (q3H +
1)qA/2n.
Proof. Let (Hb, Hb¯) = (H
R,R), where R is an n-bit random oracle and b and
HR are defined by adversary A1. Let Y be the target image. Consider an eval-
uation CH1,H2(kl,M), where M has not been evaluated so far. The evaluation
constitutes a preimage if
CH1,H2(kl,M) = R(U b¯(M))⊕HR(U b(M)) = Y , (8)
for some random distributions U b¯, U b corresponding to (2). If this happens, at
least one of the following two events occurred:
E1 : H
R(U b(M)) evaluates R(U b¯(M)) ,
E2 : ¬E1 ∧ (8) .
By Lem. 1 equation (6) (or in fact a slight variation to ` blocks, which gives the
same lower bound), U b¯(M) given U b(M) has min-entropy at least n−2 log(qH).
In other words, any call to R by HR evaluates U b¯(M) with probability at most
2−(n−2 log(qH)) = q2H/2
n. As HR makes qH evaluations, E1 happens with prob-
ability at most q3H/2
n. Regarding E2, by ¬E1 the call to R is independent of
HR(U b(M)) and (8) holds with probability 1/2n.
As A has qA attempts, it finds a preimage with probability at most (q3H +
1)qA/2n. uunionsq
Theorem 2. For any adversary A, where A2 makes qA queries and where every
evaluation of HR makes at most qH calls to R, we have AdvcollC (A) ≤ (3q3H +
1)q2A/2
n+1.
Proof. Let (Hb, Hb¯) = (H
R,R), where R is an n-bit random oracle and b and
HR are defined by adversaryA1. Consider two evaluations CH1,H2 of two distinct
M,M ′. The two evaluations constitute a collision if
R(U b¯(M))⊕R(U b¯(M ′)) = HR(U b(M))⊕HR(U b(M ′)) , (9)
for some random distributions U b¯, U b corresponding to (2). If this happens, at
least one of the following four events occurred:
E1 : U
b¯(M) = U b¯(M ′) ,
E2 : H
R(U b(M)) evaluates R(U b¯(M)) ,
E3 : H
R(U b(M ′)) evaluates R(U b¯(M)) ,
E4 : ¬(E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3) ∧ (9) .
By Lem. 1 equation (4), E1 holds with probability at most q
2
H/2
n. Similar to the
proof of Thm. 1, E2 and E3 happen with probability at most q
3
H/2
n (by Lem. 1
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equations (5) and (6)). Regarding E4, by ¬(E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3) the call to R(U b¯(M))
is independent of the other terms and (9) holds with probability 1/2n.
As A has qA attempts, it finds a collision with probability at most (2q3H +
q2H + 1)
(
qA
2
)
/2n ≤ (3q3H + 1)q2A/2n+1. uunionsq
Theorem 3. For any adversary A, where A2 makes qA queries and where every
evaluation of HR makes at most qH calls to R, we have Advesec[λ]C (A) ≤ (3q3H +
1)qA/2n.
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Thm. 2 with the difference that the
first message M is fixed in advance. uunionsq
Remark 1. We remark that the terms q3H in fact also appear in the bounds
of Mittelbach [27], though accidentally dropped out. (Lem. 2 of [27] considers
q = max{qH , qA}, while Prop. 2 treats q as being qA.) That said, as HR should
be an efficient hash function, it is fair to assume that it makes a limited amount
of evaluations of R. Particularly, if qH = O(1), we retain the original security
bounds.
Remark 2. The results hold with the same bounds if the messages were padded
into n′-bit message blocks for n′ < n, and if k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1}n′ . Changing the size
of l1, l2 would, on the other hand, directly affect the security bounds.
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A Breaking the Fix with Stateful HR
We present an attack on CH1,H2 of Sect. 6 in the artificial case that HR is allowed
to maintain state. We note that this attack does not invalidate the security proofs
of Sect. 6, and it is solely presented for theoretical interest. In more detail, in
the next proposition we show how to extend the attack of Prop. 1. The attack is
more advanced, as A2 (who knows the li’s) needs to pass those on to HR (which
does not know these). Note that HR is, indeed, defined by A1 without a priori
knowledge of the keys, but we assume HR can hold state.
Proposition 3. There exists an adversary A making 3 queries, such that
AdvcollC (A) = 1.
13
Proof. Let R be a random oracle and k1, k2, l1, l2 $←− {0, 1}n. We focus on an
adversary A = (A1,A2) that finds a collision for CR,HR , where HR is the hash
function defined by A1. Our adversary proceeds as follows. A1 outputs b = 2 and
the following hash function HR. The function simply outputs HR(x) = R(x)
until and including the first time it gets evaluated on HR(x) for x = 1‖y‖z
for some y, z ∈ {0, 1}n. At this point, define (l?2, l?1) = (y, z), and respond all
subsequent queries as follows:
HR(x) =
{
R(1‖l?1‖z), if x = 1‖l?2‖z for some z ∈ {0, 1}n,
0, otherwise.
(10)
Next, A2 gets as input (k1, k2, l1, l2). The first query A2 makes is M = l1, which
gets padded to l1‖pad(l1). Note that in this evaluation of CR,HR , the first query
to HR is on input of 1‖l2‖l1. The adversarial hash function is programmed in
such a way that it defines l?2 = l2 and l
?
1 = l1. The adversary A2 ignores the
outcome of the combiner evaluation.
For the remaining evaluations HR operates as (10), and we can simplify the
combiner to CR,H
R
(kl,M) = R
(
m˜11‖ · · · ‖m˜1`
)
, where
m˜1j = R(1 ‖ l1 ‖ mj ⊕ k1)⊕R(1 ‖ l?1 ‖ mj ⊕ k2) ,
for j = 1, . . . , `. Next, the adversary A2 outputs colliding pair M and M ′ =
M ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 for some M ∈ {0, 1}n. The remainder of the proof follows Prop. 1,
using l?1 = l1. uunionsq
The second preimage attack of Prop. 2 generalizes similarly. A technicality occurs
in the above attack as we assume the HR’s are evaluated in a sequential order.
In other words, the attack may fail if HR gets first evaluated for message block
pad(l1). A way to address this is to create a buffer. I.e., to make the first combiner
evaluation on a concatenation of α l1’s, hence M = l1‖ · · · ‖l1, and program HR
to define l?1 as soon as it is “seen” α times.
We remark that the attacks suggest that there does not exist any combiner
that achieves security against adversaries with state-maintaining HR: A2 can
always pass on the secret keys to HR, be it in more complicated and elaborated
ways than described in Prop. 3.
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